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FOREWORD
Counterinsurgency (COIN) has once again become the subject of contentious debate within the U.S.
Army. Its supporters insist that the new approach enshrined in the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual
(FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, led coalition forces to
turn the tide of the campaign in Iraq. Critics argue that
the surge and the end of the Shia uprising, not COIN,
led to the dramatic decline in violence from 2006-2009.
The failure of the new approach in Afghanistan, they
claim, supports their argument that expeditionary
COIN does not work. How this debate gets resolved
could have significant implications for U.S. Army
force structure in a time of shrinking defense budgets.
The author, Dr. Thomas R. Mockaitis, considers
what role, if any, COIN should play in the Army of
the future. He examines the U.S. military’s historical
experience with intrastate conflict as background for
understanding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He
then reviews the current debate over COIN as a prelude to suggesting the options facing the U.S. military.
Based upon contemporary threat assessments and current U.S. military capabilities, he concludes that COIN
should remain a core task of an enhanced U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM), which could train
conventional soldiers in COIN tactics in the event
that a large expeditionary COIN mission becomes
necessary.
Dr. Mockaitis concludes that an enhanced Special
Operations capability need not adversely affect the
Army’s ability to prepare for conventional war-fighting. Efforts to improve the tooth-to-tail ratio of combat
units, the increased use of labor-saving technology,
and reliance on contractors to perform support func-
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tions during missions can offset any reallocation of
forces to SOCOM. In today’s world, unconventional
threats abound, and they will remain prevalent for
the foreseeable future. The U.S. Army must prepare to
counter these threats while retaining its ability to fight
and win conventional wars.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The debate over counterinsurgency (COIN), seemingly dormant since the end of the Vietnam War, has
been rekindled by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the 2006 publication of the U.S. Army/
Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, practitioners and scholars have argued over
the efficacy of COIN. Supporters insist that the new
approach outlined in the manual led to the creation of
a strategy that defeated the Iraqi insurgents between
2006-2009. Critics argue that the surge of 30,000 additional troops, robust conventional operations, and the
end of the Shia uprising—not a new COIN strategy—
caused violence in Iraq to decline dramatically. They
point to the failure of the campaign in Afghanistan as
further evidence that COIN does not work. In an era
of declining Pentagon budgets, this debate has significant implications for U.S. land forces.
This monograph considers the place of COIN in
U.S. Army doctrine, training, and resource allocation.
It begins with a brief overview of the U.S. military’s
historical experience combating insurgency before
considering the recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The monograph then examines in detail the contemporary, scholarly, and professional debate over
the efficacy of COIN and its place in U.S. defense planning. Recognizing that consideration of this important issue must be grounded in an examination of the
contemporary security environment, the monograph
reviews official threat assessments. It then considers
the current U.S. military capacity for addressing identified threats. That capacity includes force structure,
doctrine, and learning institutions.
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Building on this analytical framework, this monograph considers four options vis-à-vis COIN. The
Army could revert to the post-Vietnam Era approach,
focusing on conventional war and relegating COIN
to a small Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
It could reconfigure its force structure to focus on
unconventional threats. It could, instead, try to train
two-speed soldiers capable of conducting conventional and unconventional operations; or, it could keep
COIN as a core function of an enhanced SOCOM with
the capability to train conventional forces in unconventional tactics should a large expeditionary COIN
mission be deployed. This monograph concludes that
the forth option best equips the Army for the contemporary security environment. It then makes specific recommendations for implementing this option
and suggests the Joint Special Operations Task Force
(JSOTF)-Philippines as the model for future COIN
campaigns. Finally, the monograph maintains that an
enhanced special operations forces (SOF) capability
will not adversely affect preparation for conventional war-fighting. Improving the conventional forces’
tooth-to-tail ratio, continuing to develop labor-saving
technologies, and relying on contractors to perform
support functions can offset reallocation of personnel
to SOCOM.
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THE COIN CONUNDRUM: THE
FUTURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY
AND U.S. LAND POWER
INTRODUCTION
No area of American military theory and practice
has been more contentious than counterinsurgency
(COIN). The experience of Vietnam made the U.S.
Army leery of conducting direct operations in support of states threatened by insurgency or civil war.
For the quarter-century following the fall of Saigon,
the United States avoided such conflicts. The United States provided aid to Colombia in its war with
Marxist insurgents, supported the Contras in their
campaign to overthrow the Sandinistas in El Salvador, and backed the government of the Philippines
against a 1989 coup attempt. None of these missions
included combat troops. Only in El Salvador did the
U.S. military become involved in a protracted COIN
campaign, and then only with a very small advisory
mission. Its doctrine assiduously avoided including
COIN or any other form of unconventional conflict as
a core task. The creation of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in 1987 made such avoidance easier,
because COIN could be designated a specialized task
relegated to Special Operations Forces (SOF).
This approach served the U.S. Army and Marine
Corps well until the invasion of Iraq. As the Americans arrived in Baghdad, the government collapsed.
U.S. soldiers faced an internal security situation for
which they were unprepared. By the summer of 2004,
a full-blown insurgency rocked the country. The
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extent and complexity of the threat precluded its
being handled by SOF alone. Soldiers from all combat
arms and support services found themselves deployed
on internal security duties. Almost instantly, COIN
went from being the dirtiest word in the military lexicon to the hottest topic in the armed services. The Pentagon drafted a new joint U.S. Army/Marine Corps
COIN manual, while training and education courses
embraced the once-taboo subject. The effort seemed
to pay off as the Anbar Awakening, along with the
Surge, turned the corner on the insurgency in 2007. At
about the same time, the U.S. military in Afghanistan
realized that its counterterrorism strategy, focused on
killing and capturing terrorists, was not working and
switched to COIN.
This apparent infatuation with COIN did not last
long. Within the Army, a debate arose over whether
COIN had really been as successful in Iraq as it appeared. Critics claimed that conventional methods
and changing circumstances, not a new approach to
unconventional conflict, had improved the security
situation in Iraq. The debate intensified when Baghdad proved incapable of consolidating these gains after the American withdrawal. Far from being defeated, the insurgents roared back as a newly constituted
entity, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which
swept aside an Iraqi Army trained and equipped at
great expense by the United States. Meanwhile, the
debate over COIN continued, personified by General
David H. Petraeus who supported it wholeheartedly
and General George W. Casey, Jr. who argued for a
proper balance between conventional and unconventional capabilities.1
The argument has continued over the past several
years, waged by academics and soldiers alike in a man-
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ner that has produced more heat than light. When the
dust settles, the Army will find itself in the same place
it has been for most of the post-Cold War era—on the
horns of a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, serious conventional threats exist, and the military must
be prepared to meet them. On the other, insurgencies
and insurgent-like conflicts refuse to go away no matter how difficult soldiers find them. These inescapable facts should change the nature of the debate from
the simplistic question of whether the Army should
concentrate on conventional or unconventional operations, to the more nuanced consideration of the degree
to which its forces should train and equip for each
type of conflict.
The best approach to deciding the optimal mix
of conventional and unconventional forces, doctrine,
and training is to consider the U.S. Army’s experience of COIN in light of the current scholarly and
professional debate on the subject. The lessons of that
experience can then be weighed against a realistic assessment of today’s threats and tomorrow’s risks. It
should then be possible to consider the options facing
the U.S. Army and decide which one(s) allow it to develop land forces best suited to protecting the security
and interests of the United States and its allies.
DEFINING TERMS AND SEEKING CLARITY
Insurgency.
Defining insurgency and COIN has always been
difficult, but the evolution of these activities over
the past 2 decades has made that task even harder.
During the anti-colonial struggles of the post-World
War II era, insurgency was defined as a movement
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to overthrow an existing government from within a
country through a combination of subversion, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare.2 This definition accurately
described groups like the National Liberation Front
(Front de Liberation Nationale or FLN), which ousted the
French from Algeria in 1962; or the Malayan Peoples
Liberation Army, which the British battled from 1948
to 1960; as well as a host of other revolutionary movements that sprung up in Africa and Asia following the
Second World War.
During the post-colonial era, however, it became
clear that not all insurgencies unfolded in such a
straightforward way and ended in such a definitive
manner as the classic campaigns. The Marxist insurgency waged by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia,
FARC) lasted half a century before the group signed
a peace accord with the government in 2016. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) engaged the
British for almost 30 years before the conflict ended in
a negotiated settlement. These and other cases have
led scholars to create the term “chronic insurgency.”
Chronic insurgencies not only take a very long time to
resolve; they often end in something less than victory
for one side or the other. In these conflicts, insurgents
are often content to carve out living space and set up
a shadow government within it. The Taliban would
like to regain control of Afghanistan, but it will settle
for occupying and ruling part of the country.3 In some
cases, chronic insurgencies degenerate into criminality, and in others, criminal groups behave like chronic
insurgencies governing spaces in which state sovereignty does not exist.4
The rise of al-Qaeda, with its territorial base in Afghanistan and a global network of cells and affiliated
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organizations, led several scholars to conceptualize
the terrorist threat as a global insurgency. One expert created a new term to describe the organization/
movement. In her statement to a Congressional committee on February 3, 2004, National War College Professor Lani Kass suggested the term “pansurgency”
to describe the al-Qaeda phenomenon. “We’re faced
with a new strategic equation,” she stated, “an insurgency of global proportions—what I’d call a PANSURGENCY—meaning a networked, transnational
movement, aimed at overthrowing values, cultures,
and societies by means of terrorism, subversion, and
armed conflict.”5
While it may be useful to conceptualize al-Qaeda
and similar threats in such terms, most insurgencies
occur within a specific locale. Even if they have an international dimension, their center of gravity is usually in a specific place. Al-Qaeda has a headquarters of
sorts in the tribal area of Pakistan. Al-Shabaab is affiliated with al-Qaeda, but it concentrates its operations
in Somalia and has been able to strike only at neighboring Kenya and Uganda. Boko Haram has sworn
allegiance to ISIS as the new Caliphate, but it operates
almost exclusively in Nigeria and neighboring countries. The nature of insurgency has thus evolved, but
perhaps not as much as the proponents of the terms
“chronic insurgency” and “pansurgency” suggest.
Counterinsurgency (COIN).
Like the conflicts it seeks to combat, COIN has also
evolved. In the era of colonial warfare, the Europeans described such operations as “imperial policing”
or “small wars,” a term also used by the U.S. Marine
Corps to describe its operations in Latin America and

5

the Caribbean during the 1920s and 1930s.6 The term
“counterinsurgency” came into vogue after the Second World War and referred to combating rebellions.
Threatened states took different approaches to COIN
with varying degrees of success. All approaches, however, involved two broad categories of activity: 1. Efforts to address the causes of unrest upon which the
insurgency fed, often referred to as “winning hearts
and minds”; and 2. Counter-guerrilla operations.
Today, the U.S. Department of Defense defines
COIN succinctly as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and
contain insurgency and address its root causes.”7 Attacking causes of unrest might entail improving the
quality of life of ordinary people through economic
and social activities and/or engaging in political reform, such as granting local autonomy. Countering
insurgent guerrillas involves small units operating on
timely, accurate intelligence. Ideally, the elements of
COIN work synergistically: reform induces support
for the government by erstwhile disaffected people
who provide the security forces with information
on the whereabouts of the insurgents. This information enables the military and police to use force in a
selective and focused manner. The two sides of the
campaign must be coordinated through the effective
mechanism of civil-military cooperation.
Unlike its European counterparts, the United
States has virtually always conducted COIN operations in support of an allied government. Only in the
case of the Philippine insurrection at the turn of the
20th century was the U.S. Government under attack.
This tendency to conduct COIN on behalf of others
has led one analyst to create a new term to describe
the large-scale operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At
a June 2010 conference, National War College Profes6

sor Harvey Rishikof introduced the phrase “expeditionary counterinsurgency,” which he said several of
his students had been using in online discussions for
one of his courses.8 The term has been widely accepted
as an apt description of missions in which the United
States not only advises a threatened state, but also
bears much of the responsibility for conducting the
COIN campaign on its behalf. “Expeditionary COIN”
has become the focus of an intense, often acrimonious
debate among academics and practitioners. Some critics insist such operations have never really succeeded.
Others maintain that even if it has sometimes worked,
expeditionary COIN is not worth its cost in blood and
treasure. They have also tended to equate all COIN
with expeditionary COIN, ignoring those cases in
which different, smaller-scale approaches have been
effective. Resolving this debate is a necessary prequel
to deciding what human and material resources the
Army should devote to preparing for future COIN
campaigns.
Doctrine and Strategy.
The terms “doctrine” and “strategy” are so basic
to military operations that defining them should be a
matter of stating the obvious for any soldier or student of war. Unfortunately, much of the criticism of
COIN rests on a mistaken conflation of these two concepts.9 Doctrine refers to the “Fundamental principles
by which the military forces or elements thereof guide
their actions in support of national objectives.” The
official definition includes the important caveat that
doctrine “is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”10 Strategy is “a prudent idea or set of ideas
for employing the instruments of national power in a
synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve the7

ater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”11 Put
another way, strategy is the application of doctrine to
a specific situation. While bad doctrine usually results
in poor strategy, good doctrine does not automatically
produce good strategy. “Judgment in application” is
necessary to turn principles into plans. Under some
circumstances, even a good strategy derived from
sound doctrine will not produce victory. Some wars,
conventional or unconventional, cannot be won. Unfortunately, critics frequently equate the failure of a
specific COIN campaign with the inefficacy of COIN
doctrine. Before examining the scholarly and professional debates on COIN, however, it is necessary to
review the experience of the U.S. military with this
most difficult type of warfare.
COIN, AMERICAN STYLE
Frontier Warfare.
Because the United States never had a formal empire, its military has had less experience with COIN
than have those of the European imperial powers. Although the United States has engaged in a number of
campaigns, these missions occurred over too broad a
span of time to allow for the formation of a distinctly
American approach to this type of conflict and its orderly transmission to successive generations of soldiers. Victory in the Second World War, achieved as
a result of abundant resources and manpower with
the application of massive firepower, confirmed the
efficacy of what Russell Weigley called “the American
way of war.” This approach produced an awesome
conventional military establishment, but one ill-suited
to COIN.12
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Contrary to popular belief, though, American
Armed Forces had engaged in unconventional conflict
long before they fought conventional wars. English
colonists organized into ranger units battled Native
Americans and French Canadians during the 17th and
18th centuries. These irregular units played an important role in both the French and Indian War and the
American Revolution. Companies of backwoods riflemen and local militias supported Continental regulars
in many engagements during the War for Independence. This ranger tradition forms what John Grenier
describes as the “first American way of war.”13 After
American independence, irregular warfare continued on the American frontier throughout much of
the 19th century. Frontier warfare, however, differed
from modern COIN in one key respect. Rangers had
no need to exercise restraint in order to win hearts
and minds. Indeed, extirpative warfare, destruction of
crops and villages, and the slaughter of native peoples
characterized frontier warfare.14
The Philippines and Latin America.
The U.S. military’s first exposure to modern COIN
came in the Philippines following the Spanish American War. After liberating the territory from Spain,
the United States decided to continue occupying it,
replacing the Spaniards as the islands’ new colonial
master. The guerrillas who had fought for independence soon engaged the Americans. From 1899 to 1902,
insurgents led by Emilio Aguinaldo conducted an insurgency to drive out the new occupiers. Although
American forces did employ draconian measures and
at times used excessive force to combat the insurgents,
they defeated Aguinaldo by devising and imple-
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menting a comprehensive strategy, combining what
would later be called civil affairs (CA) projects to win
popular support with small-unit, anti-guerrilla operations. U.S. Army contingents in local villages built
schools, improved sanitation, and inoculated children
against smallpox, while American civilian administrators doled out patronage jobs to loyal Filipinos.15
U.S. forces divided the region threatened by insurgents into operational areas and sub-areas, allowing
the troops stationed there to get to know the terrain
and the local people. Small American units aided by
Filipino scouts who spoke the local language pursued
the guerrillas.16 This strategy allowed approximately
24,000 American troops to defeat an insurgent movement that may have numbered 80,000 at its peak.17
While the U.S. Army first practiced COIN in the
Philippines, the U.S. Marines learned it in Latin America. Since it had built the Panama Canal at the turn of
the 20th century, the United States had come to regard
Central America and the islands of the Caribbean as
its exclusive security zone. This assertion of American power led to interventions by the Marines in several regional countries. In 1915, they occupied Haiti,
where they remained until 1934. The following year,
they occupied its neighbor, the Dominican Republic,
staying in that country until 1924. From 1928 to 1929,
Marine Captain Merritt “Red Mike” Edson pursued
Nicaraguan insurgents led by Augusto Sandino along
the Rio Coco in Nicaragua. In all of these missions, the
Marines conducted operations far closer to COIN than
to conventional war.
The Marine Corps preserved its Latin American
experience in the now-famous Small Wars Manual
published in 1940. The manual showed a keen appreciation of what it called “small wars,” which would
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later be dubbed “insurgencies.” “The application of
purely military measures may not, by itself, restore
peace and orderly government,” the book counseled,
“because the fundamental causes of the conditions of
unrest may be economic, political, or social.” From
this premise followed the conclusion that in such
campaigns, “military measures to be applied must be
of secondary importance.”18 In addition to explaining
the unique nature of insurgent-style conflict, the Small
Wars Manual contained a wealth of information on
a broad range of relevant subjects, including proper
treatment of civilians and small-unit, counter-guerrilla tactics. Unfortunately, the outbreak of World War
II so altered the mission of the Marine Corps that it
forgot its own COIN experience. Most leathernecks
deploying to Vietnam in the 1960s did not even know
the manual existed.
Vietnam.
Fifty years after the fall of Saigon, the Vietnam War
continues to be a subject of intense debate among historians. Almost every aspect of the conflict has been
analyzed and disputed.19 The critics even disagree as
to precisely what type of war Americans were fighting in Southeast Asia. Many of those who insist the
United States should not have gone to Vietnam in the
first place, as well as some of those who consider it
a just war waged badly, view the conflict as an anticolonial insurgency that the large-scale conventional
American military was ill-suited to fight. The failure of
this mission led the U.S. Army to conclude that COIN
campaigns should be assiduously avoided. Closer
examination of the Vietnam War, however, reveals it
to have been a far more complex phenomenon than
either its critics or supporters have appreciated.
11

Vietnam was a hybrid war with a conventional
and an unconventional dimension. Given its structure
and commitment to firepower and maneuver, the U.S.
military understandably focused on the conventional
side. Unfortunately, it also used conventional means
to counter the unconventional threat posed by the
National Front, commonly known as the Viet Cong.
With too few troops to conduct a grassroots COIN
campaign, Military Assistance Command Vietnam
(MACV), and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
(ARVN) that it supported, engaged in search-anddestroy operations. Ground forces transported by helicopter would fix Viet Cong units so that they could
be destroyed by artillery and airpower. This approach
had two serious shortcomings. First, U.S. and ARVN
forces could clear but not hold territory. As soon as
they left, the insurgents returned. Second, the application of massive firepower killed a lot of civilians,
increasing their distrust of the government and its
American backers and encouraging them to support
the Viet Cong.
Some officers took issue with conventional tactics
and argued for a different approach to countering the
insurgency. Marine Corps Major General Victor Krulak advocated for “pacification,” a strategy that would
replace search-and-destroy with “clear and hold.” He
insisted that the MACV must shift its attention from
the Central Highlands to the Mekong Delta and the
coastal plain, where 90% of South Vietnamese lived.
Krulak created Combined Action Platoons (CAPs),
each with a Marine rifle section (12-15 men) joined to
a local militia platoon (approximately 30 men) to defend threatened villages.20 In 1967, the United States
also instituted Civil Operations and Revolutionary
Development Support (CORDS), an umbrella pro-
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gram for economic and social improvement projects.
Pacification employed sound COIN principles, but it
was not a panacea; nor is it clear that applying it more
extensively earlier in the war would have produced
victory.
Whatever the merits of pacification, MACV commander General William Westmoreland employed it
only on a limited scale, deeming North Vietnamese
and Viet Cong conventional operations to be a greater
threat to Saigon than insurgency. The Tet Offensive
of 1968 indicates that his fears were not as unfounded
as his critics have claimed. Westmoreland’s successor,
General Creighton Abrams, applied pacification on a
broader scale, adding amnesty for insurgents and linking the COIN effort with the Phoenix Program, which
assassinated National Front leaders. This change in
strategy did produce notable results, but it weakened,
without destroying, the Viet Cong leadership.21
Pacification suffered from two fatal flaws: it required more troops than the United States was willing
to commit, and it could not compensate for the lack of
support the Saigon government had among its own
people. A 1967 Pentagon study determined that a nationwide pacification program would have required
167,000 combat troops; at its peak, MACV had only
80,000.22 At the end of the day, the United States could
not save the Saigon government from itself. The cost
of the war in blood and treasure had become unacceptable to the American people. Just how weak the
Saigon government really was soon became apparent.
Following American withdrawal in 1973, the country
fell to the North Vietnamese in just 2 years.
The proper conclusion to draw from the conflict
should have been that even a good strategy like pacification would not save a government that refuses to

13

engage in meaningful reform to win the support of its
own disaffected people. The armed forces of one state
cannot by themselves win the hearts and minds of the
people in another. The U.S. Army, however, drew a
different conclusion: COIN itself was a bad idea. The
political establishment agreed. In a televised address
to the American people on November 3, 1969, Richard Nixon articulated the doctrine that would bear his
name. “We shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty
commitments,” Nixon told a press conference, “but we
shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume
the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.”23 Out of this statement developed
the policy of “foreign aid for internal defense,” under
which the American military would provide small advisory missions rather than large troop deployments
to assist governments threatened by insurgency. “No
more Vietnams” became a Pentagon mantra. The creation of SOCOM in 1987 made it easy for the Regular
Army to treat COIN as specialized task, and not its
concern.
El Salvador.
The test of the new policy came less than a decade
after the United States left Vietnam. In 1980, opposition groups united to form the Fabrundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) and launched an insurgency
against the Salvadoran government. In a country of 4.7
million people, in which 1% of the population owned
70% of the land, the FMLN enjoyed popular support
among the urban poor and impoverished peasants.24
The FMLN had an estimated 12,000 fighters, and
the Salvadoran Army had approximately 15,000 sol-
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diers.25 Ill equipped, badly led, and filled with demoralized conscripts, the Salvadoran Armed Forces performed so poorly against the insurgents that by 1983
the government faced defeat. Having just seen the
pro-American regime in Nicaragua fall to the Marxist
Sandinistas, the administration of Ronald Reagan did
not intend to sit by and watch another Latin American
country become Communist.
The Reagan administration realized, however, that
neither Congress nor the American people favored
a large-scale U.S. deployment. Only a modest effort
would be tolerated, and even that would face opposition because of the Salvadoran government’s horrendous human rights record. Aid to the embattled
regime took three forms: supplying the Salvadoran
Armed Forces with equipment, training its officers in
the United States and Panama, and deploying a small
advisory team to El Salvador. Congress limited the size
of the U.S. Military Advisory Group to 55 and prohibited it from going into the field with the Salvadorans.
The Reagan administration, however, found ways to
circumvent the limitation, deploying as many as 150
advisors by 1984, many of them SOF “A” teams (12man units) to train the Salvadoran Army in COIN.26
The American effort seemed to be working. With
the benefit of U.S. equipment and training, the Salvadoran Army became more effective. Helicopters enabled its troops to deploy to remote areas rapidly and
apply consistent pressure on the FMLN, forcing the
insurgents to revert to small-unit guerrilla tactics. By
the end of the 1980s, the organization had been weakened and the Salvadoran government had grown
more conciliatory under U.S. pressure. This change in
circumstances made it possible for the United Nations
to broker talks that eventually led to a peace settle-
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ment. The FMLN became a political party, which went
on to win an election and govern El Salvador. More
than a quarter-century later, a recurrence of armed
conflict seems unlikely.
The outcome of the Salvadoran civil war has led
military and academic analysts to herald it as a sterling example of what a small-footprint advisory mission can accomplish and to juxtapose it against the
large-scale, unsuccessful missions in Vietnam, Iraq,
and Afghanistan. David Ucko, however, has raised
serious concerns about interpreting the conflict as a
good example of successful COIN. Material aid was
probably more important to the Salvadoran military
than COIN strategy and tactics. U.S. efforts to compel
the government and its armed forces to improve their
human rights record, generally regarded as crucial to
successful COIN, had limited success. However, even
with the equipment the United States provided, the
Salvadoran military could not defeat the insurgents.
The negotiated settlement, Ucko argues, owed more
to the end of the Cold War, which led Moscow to
withdraw support for the FMLN and made it possible
for Washington to make aid to the Salvadoran government contingent upon better behavior, than it did
to the success of the U.S. Military Advisory Mission.27
His analysis serves as a reminder that, since each campaign is unique, trying to apply the “lessons” of one to
another will always be problematic. The key to learning from the past is to distill broad principles from
campaigns, not to look for precise templates.
Iraq and the Resurgence of U.S. COIN.
The decade between the end of the Salvadoran
civil war and the invasion of Iraq saw no appreciable change in U.S. COIN doctrine. During the 1990s,
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however, the Army became involved in a variety of
unconventional activities and incorporated them
in its doctrine under the new category, “Operations
Other than War.” As instructed by the 1993 version
of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations Explained, the
Army might undertake complex, sensitive operations
ranging from:
support to U.S., state, and local governments, disaster relief, nation assistance, and drug interdiction to
peacekeeping, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, non-combatant evacuation and peace
enforcement.28

COIN was in the mix, but clearly not the priority as
the U.S. military focused on humanitarian interventions and peace operations.
As it soon became clear, though, peace enforcement looked a lot like COIN.29 The experience of Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo left the military and the
country leery of interventions in civil conflicts, which
might lead to protracted missions with open-ended
commitments. Then-President George W. Bush had
campaigned on a promise to avoid “nation building.”
The 9/11 terrorist attacks dramatically changed the
security environment and necessitated invading Afghanistan. Saddam Hussein had been a manageable
nuisance since the Gulf War of 1991, and the Bush administration never succeeded in making more than a
tenuous connection between him and the threat of terrorism. In the climate of heightened anxiety following
9/11, however, even a small risk that the Iraqis had or
might acquire weapons of mass destruction seemed
unacceptable.
As much as the Bush administration wished to
invade Iraq, though, it still wanted to avoid nation
building. The Pentagon thus planned a rapid drive
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to Baghdad, exploiting the vast American advantage
in technology and firepower, followed by a handover to a new democratic Iraqi government and the
timely withdrawal of U.S. forces. The planners forgot,
however, that all occupations fall subject to a simple
rule: you break it, you buy it. The assumption that the
thousands of Iraqi bureaucrats and civil servants who
ran the country would remain at their jobs waiting
for the United States to usher in a new government
proved wildly optimistic. The Iraqi government collapsed, widespread looting destroyed much of what
remained of the country’s fragile infrastructure, and
in the power vacuum arose a complex and intransigent insurgency, which U.S. forces had not planned
for or were prepared to counter.
Most analysts, as well many of the men and
women who fought in Iraq, refer to a lost year from
the end of major hostilities in May 2003, through the
spring of 2004. During that period, the military and
its civilian counterpart, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), not only failed to counter the growing
insurgency, but took actions that made it worse. The
CPA decided to disband the Iraqi armed forces without compensation and to exclude former Ba’ath Party
members from holding office, thus adding to unemployment, which reached 67 percent.30 These ill-advised moves embittered Iraqis, as did an over-reliance
on conventional methods, which killed innocent civilians. Heavily armed, often-undisciplined private contractors who used force with even less discrimination
added to the popular outrage, which fueled the insurgency. American forces soon faced a Shia uprising, a
Sunni insurgency, and an international terrorist campaign perpetrated by the al-Qaeda affiliate, “al-Qaeda
in the Land of the Two Rivers,” commonly known as
“al-Qaeda in Iraq.”
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As the conflict intensified, American forces and
policymakers discovered—or rediscovered—effective
COIN strategies and tactics. In November 2005, the
White House revealed its Strategy for Victory in Iraq,
which embraced the principles of “clear, hold, and
build.”31 American and Iraqi forces would clear areas
of insurgents, occupy the liberated areas, and build
physical infrastructure and governing institutions to
prevent the insurgents from returning. Provincial Reconstruction Teams were established to oversee these
development projects. U.S. soldiers and Marines adopted small-unit tactics, and the United States spent
billions training and equipping a new Iraqi Army and
police force.
A doctrinal revolution accompanied the changes
on the ground. In 2006, the Pentagon produced its first
new COIN manual in decades. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, contains a wealth of theoretical information on
insurgency and COIN. It begins with a clear delineation of the types of insurgency and a historical overview of the phenomenon, outlines established principles for combating insurgents, and then discusses how
these principles must be adapted to contemporary
circumstances. The manual presents five “Contemporary Imperatives of Counterinsurgency” to guide the
creation of an effective strategy: “Manage Information
and Expectations. . . . Use the Appropriate Level of
Force. . . . Learn and Adapt. . . . Empower the Lowest
Levels. . . . Support the Host Nation.”32 General David
Petraeus, who had commanded the 101st Airborne Division in Iraq, was the driving force behind the effort
to produce the new manual. Petraeus and his supporters represented an emerging school of thought advocating COIN as a core U.S. Army task.
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In addition to this change in approach, several developments helped turn the tide of the war in Iraq. In
late-2006, American troops in Anbar Province began
working with local Sheiks to combat the foreign mujahedeen of al-Qaeda in Iraq, whom many Iraqis considered a greater threat to their way of life than coalition
forces. The United States paid the Sheiks a monthly
remittance and trained former insurgents to be police
officers. Just as the Anbar Awakening was getting under way, President Bush authorized the deployment
of approximately 30,000 additional troops to Iraq,
bringing peak U.S. strength to 187,900 in 2008.33 Then
in August 2007, Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr declared
a unilateral ceasefire, which he renewed in 2008, thus
ending the Shia uprising. All of these factors combined to produce a steady decline in U.S. casualty
rates. Conditions improved so much that in 2009, the
United States could begin to draw down its forces
significantly and to withdraw its remaining combat
troops by the agreed upon deadline of December 2011.
Given the dramatic turnaround in the course of the
insurgency during 2007, readers may wonder why debates over the new Iraq strategy have been so intense.
By all indicators, COIN appears to have worked.
Several factors make such a simplistic conclusion
problematic. So many things came together in 2007;
determining which one or what combination of them
proved decisive is very difficult. Supporters of COIN
can reasonably argue that the new doctrine made it
possible to integrate the increased assets and fortuitous occurrences into a winning strategy. Critics can
just as easily claim that, combined with the increasing
number of trained Iraqi forces and the end of the Shia
uprising, the surge made it possible for the coalition
to employ more conventional forces in destroying

20

insurgents worn down by 4 years of war. They might
also add that since Iraq has fragmented and ISIS has
arisen from the ashes of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the entire
occupation was a dismal failure. The optimists could
retort that the rise of ISIS and the breakup of Iraq resulted from the failure of the Shia-led government to
consolidate the victory after American forces left. Unfortunately, resolving any or all of these debates will
not answer the question of whether expeditionary
COIN actually works. Failure of a campaign does not
equate to the inefficacy of a doctrine. The Iraqis had to
consolidate the U.S. victory, and their failure to do so
does not detract from the American success.
COINdinistas AND COINtras:
THE COIN DEBATE
The high cost and dubious outcome of the war in
Iraq have spawned a lively discussion among academics and soldiers on the efficacy of COIN. That
argument began during the war itself and has continued ever since. Events in Afghanistan have intensified
the debate. In 2009, newly-elected President Barack
Obama ordered a surge of approximately 30,000
troops to Afghanistan and sent General Petraeus, the
alleged mastermind of COIN in Iraq, to oversee the
operation. The fall of the northern city of Kunduz to
the Taliban in September 2015 suggests that this strategy has failed, a conclusion reinforced by the decision
to keep American troops in the country beyond the
agreed withdrawal date. After more than a decade of
aid and training, the Afghan Army still cannot go it
alone. Several analysts argue that the failure of this
latest surge owes much to Petraeus’s insistence that
the strategy used in Iraq could be applied to the vastly
different circumstances of Afghanistan.34
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The COIN debate has taken several forms. The
most strident critics of COIN argue, often vehemently,
that COIN simply does not work and should not be
attempted. Not only do they use the examples of the
recent war in Iraq and the current one in Afghanistan
to make their case, but they also rummage through
history looking for evidence that COIN has never
really succeeded anywhere. Most critics, however,
avoid such hyperbole and take a more measured approach to the debate. Some have reassessed the Iraq
War to consider what role, if any, COIN played in the
successes of 2007-2009. Others argue over whether coercive force or winning hearts and minds played the
greatest role in the success of past COIN campaigns.
Examination of these debates must precede consideration of what role COIN should play in current and
future U.S. Army doctrine, training, and land forces
allocation.
COINdinistas.
Historian and national security analyst Douglas
Porch created the word “COINdinista” to describe
those academics and practitioners who defend the
efficacy of COIN and insist upon its importance to
the U.S. military. This derogatory term parodies the
Marxist “Sandinistas,” who governed Nicaragua in
the 1980s. According to Porch, any scholar or soldier
who believes COIN to be a valid category of armed
conflict and sees value in preparing for it might qualify as a COINdinista, but he and the other extreme
critics have a short list of proponents whose views
they particularly dislike. John Nagl, author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons
from Malay and Vietnam, has long been the bête noir of
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the COIN critics.35 Nagl argued not only that COIN
worked, but also that the British Army was better at
it than the American Army because it was a “learning institution.” U.S. Army officers understandably
bristled at this suggestion, especially when the British
performed so poorly in Basra, Iraq.
As the main proponent and most famous practitioner of COIN in Iraq, General Petraeus comes in
for extensive criticism as well. In the difficult years of
2004 and 2005, Petraeus had been one of the few commanders who seemed to achieve significant results in
his area of operation north of Baghdad. Early in 2006,
he published an article in the Military Review outlining
his approach to COIN and arguing emphatically that
it should be employed to the whole of Iraq.36 He listed
fourteen principles for successful COIN:
1. Do not try to do too much with your own hands.
2. Act quickly, because every Army of liberation has
a half-life.
3. Money is ammunition.
4. Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical
to success.
5. Analyze “costs and benefits” before each
operation.
6. Intelligence is the key to success.
7. Everyone must do nation building.
8. Help build institutions, not just units.
9. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier.
10. Success in a counterinsurgency requires more
than just military operations.
11. Ultimate success depends on local leaders.
12. Remember the strategic corporals and strategic
lieutenants.
13. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable
leaders.
14. A leader’s most important task is to set the right
tone.37

23

Petraeus argued not only for overhauling the Iraq War
strategy, but also for making COIN a core U.S. military
task. “America’s overwhelming conventional military
superiority makes it unlikely that future enemies will
confront us head on,” he insisted. “Rather, they will
attack us asymmetrically, avoiding our strengths—
firepower, maneuver, technology—and come at us
and our partners the way the insurgents do in Iraq
and Afghanistan.”38
A cadre of officers and civilian advisers, who came
to be known as the “Petraeus School,” made the case
for the importance of COIN. Kalev Sepp’s article,
“Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” provided recommendations similar to those of Petraeus.39 The anthropologist Montgomery McFate insisted on the importance of cultural awareness in COIN and argued
for the need to teach it to soldiers. Noted COIN expert
and senior advisor to General Petraeus in Iraq and to
General Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan, David
Kilcullen, has written numerous books on the subject.
These include: The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small
Wars in the Midst of a Big One; Counterinsurgency; and
Out of the Mountains: the Coming of Age of the Urban
Guerrilla.40 Kilcullen makes a compelling case that
COIN needs to be a core task of the U.S. military for
the simple reason that unconventional war will be the
most persistent form of armed conflict for the foreseeable future.
The COINtras.
If COIN advocates are to be labeled “COINdinistas,” critics of COIN should be dubbed “COINtras,”
in keeping with the Nicaraguan civil war motif. The
COINtras have several characteristics in common.
They dismiss COIN doctrine as a myth; they draw
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sweeping conclusions about campaigns over broad
ranges of time; and they insist that the U.S. military
should avoid COIN entirely. They are also terribly
preoccupied with debunking the Malayan Emergency
(1948-1960) as an instructive example, which amounts
to flaying a horse that has been dead for a long time.
The titles of three prominent works in this school illustrate their hyperbolic nature: Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War;
Gian Gentile, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of
Counterinsurgency; and, M.L.R. Smith and David Martin Jones, The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency.41
Porch has written the most comprehensive of the
three critiques of COINdinista thought, though ironically the weakest on documentation. He scours the
period from the 18th to the 21st centuries for evidence
to prove that COIN has never been a distinctive form
of warfare and has never really worked. The apparent victories that threatened states have won, particularly those of the colonial powers in the 20th century,
he explains away as failures of the insurgents rather
than successes by their opponents. He claims that the
“new way of war” had no impact on turning the tide
in Iraq and concludes that, at the end of the day, COIN
is little more than a bag of tactical tricks. Porch also
implies throughout his book that conventional wars
are “clean” and unconventional ones are “dirty,” a
distinction anyone on the Eastern Front during World
War II would surely have found dubious. In a review
of Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New
Way of War, published in Small Wars and Insurgencies,
David Ucko thoroughly eviscerates Porch’s argument.42 He takes Porch to task for distorting the definition of COIN to create a straw man—cherry-picking
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both historical examples and evidence—and conflating theory, strategy, and tactics. To this scathing critique must be added another criticism: the absence of
documentation. The gold standard for historical research has always been the author’s ability to muster
primary source material—documents from the period
under study—to support arguments. Porch, however,
bases his sweeping conclusions almost entirely on
secondary works.
Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency is better documented and more narrowly focused, but is equally sweeping in its core conclusions.
It does, however, contain some very good insights.
Written by Colonel Gian Gentile, whom Porch describes as a “kindred spirit,”43 the book examines Malaya, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In fewer than
150 pages, using only these four examples, Gentile
concludes that “the idea that counterinsurgency works
is wrong—and history supports this assertion.”44 He
examines very little history and provides insufficient
evidence to support such an emphatic statement. His
criticism of Malaya as a model for modern COIN appears directed at Nagl, whom American critics feel
has exercised undue influence on U.S. Army doctrine.
Most analysts who advocate for the efficacy of COIN
doctrine, however, have long since recognized the
limitations of the Malayan Emergency as a guide for
contemporary practice. Gentile does, however, ground
his chapter on Vietnam soundly in the historiographical debate, noting that advocates of COIN have glommed on to the discredited “better war” school, which
argues that the earlier and more extensive application
of pacification rather than overwhelming conventional force might have won the war.45 Finally, Gentile’s
critique seems driven by an understandable, if exag-
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gerated, fear of what COIN will do to the U.S. Army.
“As a model for American Warfare in the future,” he
concludes, “counterinsurgency threatens to transform
the army and other parts of the defense establishment
into a force organized for nation building, exporting
stability to the troubled and obdurate precincts of the
globe.”46
These criticisms of Wrong Turn notwithstanding,
the book contains an excellent chapter on Iraq, based
upon good research and the author’s own experience
during the war. Gentile rightly challenges the notion
that a dramatic transformation in the U.S. military
approach to combating the insurgents took place between 2006 and 2009, arguing instead that improvement came from gradual pragmatic adjustments to
circumstances. He also notes that the conflict was a
complex mix of civil war and insurgency. The decline
in violence from 2007 on, he claims, owed more to the
segregation of ethnic communities, which diminished
violence between them, and an end to the Shia uprising than it did to COIN. In the midst of this insightful discussion, though, Gentile makes an observation
about his own experience that overturns the main
argument of his book. “From the start,” he explains,
“my brigade focused on building better governance
and security forces, infrastructure and the economy,
and combating the Sunni insurgency.”47 One would
be hard pressed to come up with a better definition of
COIN. Perhaps what Gentile objects to is not so much
COIN per se, but its particular formulation by the U.S.
military in Iraq.
The third major tome in the COINtras’ trilogy is
a highly theoretical work that challenges the efficacy
of COIN based upon strategic theory. Written by two
political scientists, the British M. L. R. Smith and the
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Australian David Martin Jones, The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency argues that because
the term “insurgency” covers so many types of conflict, it has little value as a category of military activity.
This imprecision, they maintain, in turn renders COIN
a vague idea with no operational use. Smith and Jones
further insist that no country has ever had a successful COIN tradition. Alleged British prowess in “small
wars,” “imperial policing,” and COIN is merely a narrative created by academics and adopted by the British Army as a self-congratulatory myth.48 Insurgency
has always been hard to define, as has COIN, but that
fact does not make such conflicts any less real or the
need to counter them any less important. In the real
world, functional definitions sometimes work better
than theoretical ones. “What does it look like?” may
be a more useful question than “What is it?” Smith
and Jones further argue that “political will,” not COIN
doctrine, strategy, or practice, produced victory in
Malaya and other successful campaigns. Since political will in democratic societies equates to popular
support, however, maintaining it requires an effective
doctrine and strategy for winning—whether the conflict be conventional or unconventional.
Moderate Critics.
Unlike the COINtras, most analysts who raise valid
concerns about COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan do not throw the baby out with the bath water.
Many writers have questioned the idea that a dramatic transformation in the American approach to waging
the war took place in Iraq from 2006-2009. They note
that soldiers and Marines began adapting as soon as
the insurgency developed in 2004, and that much of
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what they learned made its way into the new COIN
manual. The transformation was as much bottom-up
as top down, although the White House still had to
encourage the new approach with its 2005 Strategy for
Victory in Iraq.49 Some of those who emphasize gradual change over sudden transformation challenge the
notion that General Petraeus deserves as much credit
as his supporters claim, although they do recognize
his role as a catalyst in getting FM 3-24 written.50
Finally, as one author rightly points out, the adoption of COIN did not mean the end of conventional
operations.51
The COIN approach, developed in Iraq and applied to the war in Afghanistan, has been the subject
of considerable discussion. Neither General Petraeus
nor his protégé, General Stanley McChrystal, were
able to stabilize the country so that U.S. troops could
hand the responsibility for security to Afghan government forces and withdraw. One analyst suggests that
this lack of success stems from a failure to recognize
the different character of the Afghan war—in particular the success of the Taliban in creating parallel hierarchies capable of governing effectively at the local
level.52 General Karl Eikenberry, who had commanded U.S. forces in Afghanistan from 2005-2007, drew
essentially the same conclusion. “Blindly following
COIN doctrine led the U.S. military to fixate on defeating the insurgency while giving short shrift to Afghan
politics,” he declared in a 2013 Foreign Affairs article.53
He argued that Generals McChrystal and Petraeus
used methods developed in Iraq as a template for
Afghanistan instead of using broad COIN principles
to develop a strategy tailored to a different country.
“Contingent on context,” Eikenberry warns, “military
doctrine is meant to be suggestive, not prescriptive.”54
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Coercion versus Hearts and Minds.
As the debate over COIN raged among those
studying American wars, an equally lively exchange of
views was taking place on the subject of British COIN.
Because both the proponents and the critics of COIN
in the U.S. military have referenced British experience
(either praising or debunking it), it is worth examining this debate. Most of those who study Britain’s
small wars do not challenge the existence of COIN as
a unique type of warfare, nor do they deny that the
British Army has had a lot of experience with it. They
also recognize that COIN involves both military and
non-military activities. They disagree over whether
coercive force or political, social, and economic reforms produced the greatest results.
A 2012 conference on British COIN expressed this
disagreement in its title: “Butcher and Bolt or Hearts
and Minds?”55 Critics of the British approach argue
that coercion rather than conciliation won Britain’s
COIN campaigns. Authors Caroline Elkins, Imperial
Reckoning: the Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya,
and David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: the Dirty
War in Kenya and the End of Empire, thoroughly document the extent of atrocities during the Mau Mau insurgency.56 Indeed, Elkins served as a Crown witness
in a civil case that awarded damages to the victims
of the security forces. Karl Hack, Hugh Bennett, and
David French have argued that a higher degree of
coercion than proponents of the British approach acknowledge characterized other campaigns as well.57
Unfortunately, the debate over the use of force in
COIN has been framed in an unhelpful way. Coercion
and winning hearts and minds were not mutually exclusive options but integrated parts of a synergistic
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strategy. During the heyday of its COIN campaigns,
the British Army’s rules of engagement limited the use
of deadly force, not other forms of coercion. The British
did compel Chinese squatters to live in secure villages
in Malaya, and the Chinese resented being moved, but
the government supplied those villages with amenities and offered residents citizenship. Most of the villages remained permanent settlements long after the
insurgency ended. The security of the new villages,
along with these benefits, encouraged the residents’
cooperation, which provided valuable intelligence on
the insurgents, allowing the security forces to capture
or kill them. Excesses did occur in all British COIN
campaigns—indeed in all COIN campaigns—just as
they do in conventional war, but that does not mean
that force alone produced success.
From Rhetoric to Reality.
The contentious nature of the debate over COIN
has stemmed, not only from the tendency of a few
writers to stake out extreme positions, but from several other complicating factors. To begin with, soldiers
have always disliked unconventional war and probably always will. Unconventional war diminishes the
advantages of a conventional military establishment
like the U.S. Army with its superior technology and
firepower. Like any group of professionals, soldiers
wish to avoid duties they do not like to perform. This
preference colors the views of some observers, who
see in the apparent COIN failures further evidence
that what they do not wish to do does not work.
The tendency of critics to conflate doctrine, strategy, and tactics further confuses the issues. Doctrine
provides a set of broad principles to guide the craft-
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ing of strategy and the shaping of tactics. Doctrine has
to be applied flexibly to design a strategy uniquely
suited to each conflict. Using one campaign as a blueprint for another is a formula for failure. The Malayan
Emergency occurred under particular circumstances
not likely to be duplicated elsewhere. Applying its approach to the war in Vietnam did not work, any more
than slavishly copying a strategy developed in Iraq
succeeded in Afghanistan. Even the best doctrine will
not produce results unless a good strategy is devised
from it. Effective tactics in turn are necessary to implement strategy, but they are not a substitute for it. Poor
tactics can defeat a sound strategy, but even the best
tactics will not redeem a poor one.
Just as they have conflated various aspects of COIN,
critics have interpreted failure in specific campaigns
as evidence that COIN in general does not work. After
years of debate, most analysts agree that no American
strategy would have produced victory in Vietnam.
That conclusion does not, however, mean that pacification failed in the areas where it was applied. Had
the government in Saigon engaged in meaningful reform, particularly land reform, to gain legitimacy and
win trust, a sound COIN strategy might have worked.
Without that legitimacy, no American military doctrine or strategy could have won the war.
The presence of these factors that obfuscate the issues, however, does not reduce the importance of two
key points raised by the critics of COIN. First, they correctly point out that conventional and unconventional
operations do not exist as neatly distinctive categories
in the real world. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan
have included COIN and conventional operations, often occurring at the same time and in support of one
another. The lines between conventional and uncon-

32

ventional conflict have blurred and will remain so for
the foreseeable future. Marine Corps General Charles
Krulak recognized this fact when he articulated his
concept of a three-block war in the late-1990s. Writing in response to the intervention in Somalia, Krulak
insisted that ordinary soldiers and marines might be
engaged in humanitarian assistance on one city block,
peacekeeping on the next, and war-fighting on the one
after that. They had to be trained and equipped to adjust as needed. “The lines separating the levels of war,
and distinguishing combatant from ‘non-combatant,’
will blur,” he said in 1999, “and adversaries, confounded by our ’conventional’ superiority, will resort
to asymmetrical means to redress the imbalance.”58
Perhaps because it was tied so closely to the big humanitarian interventions of the 1990s, the “three-block
war” quickly disappeared as a key concept in U.S.
military thought. Its core idea, that few missions will
be purely conventional or unconventional, though, remains sound.
Second, the critics remind strategists and policymakers of a painful but inescapable truth: an intervening power cannot win the hearts and minds of
another nation’s people. If the host government lacks
legitimacy and refuses to reform, no COIN strategy
devised and implemented by the United States will
enable it to defeat insurgents who enjoy popular support. No amount of military force could redeem a corrupt South Vietnamese government that refused to
engage in meaningful reform to meet the needs of its
large peasant population. While American operations
combined with the Anbar Awakening did reduce the
Sunni insurgency to a low-level threat, consolidating
that gain required the Shia Prime Minister Nuri alMaliki to govern in a non-sectarian manner, continue
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to pay the Sunni Sheiks a monthly stipend, and keep
the pressure on what remained of al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Despite persistent U.S. advice, he refused to take these
steps. The rise of ISIS and the breakup of Iraq occurred
just 3 years after the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces.
Ominous signs suggest that the same scenario is unfolding in Afghanistan. If the Taliban govern more effectively (however harshly) at the local level than the
Afghan government does, then American COIN has
little chance of success. The U.S. military can advise,
train, and support host-nation forces, but it cannot
take their place.
These and other points raised by critics should remind the U.S. Army and American policymakers that
COIN doctrine is not a panacea that will allow the
United States to intervene successfully in every internal conflict. On the other hand, the Army cannot wish
away unconventional war. Its generals can and must
advise policymakers as to which interventions have a
reasonable chance of success. Soldiers in a democratic
society, however, do not get to pick the wars they
wish to fight. At some future date, the Army will be
asked to help counter an insurgency, so it must retain
some COIN capability. The extent and nature of that
capability remain to be considered. That consideration
should begin with an examination of current doctrine
and force structure, followed by an assessment of contemporary security threats.
U.S. COIN DOCTRINE
While it would be simplistic to argue that one
doctrine is as good as another, the basic principles
of COIN have remained unchanged over the past
half-century. First, defeating an insurgency requires
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a comprehensive strategy to address the social, economic, and political causes of unrest. Second, the use
of force should be kept limited and focused to target
the insurgents without alienating the population amid
which they operate. Third, the threatened government
must develop a system to coordinate activities of the
security forces (military and police) and civil authorities involved in the COIN campaign. Ideally, these
three principles make it possible to produce a synergistic strategy: addressing the causes of unrest (a.k.a.,
winning hearts and minds) and providing security induced cooperation, which provides intelligence on the
insurgents leading to the focused use of military force
to neutralize them.
Each of these doctrinal principles has been the
subject of extensive elaboration, and several strategic
and tactical precepts can be derived from them. Numerous studies discuss the importance of intelligence.
Military manuals emphasize the limited effectiveness
of firepower and the importance of small-unit tactics.
Almost everyone who has written on the subject emphasizes junior leadership, pointing out that COIN is
a corporal and a lieutenant’s war. Any work on the
subject worth its salt stresses the need for flexibility,
emphasizes the uniqueness of each conflict, and insists on the necessity of developing a strategy tailored
to specific circumstances.
The FM 3-24 (2006).
Few FMs have attracted as much interest or
sparked as much controversy as FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. The manual, which took a year to draft, provides an overview of the nature of insurgency and a
comprehensive discussion of how to counter it.59 Con-
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trary to the critics’ claims, FM 3-24 is not merely a bag
of tactical tricks, though it does contain a wealth of
information useful to junior officers and NCOs. The
manual emphasizes formulating an effective strategy
and constantly revising it as circumstances change.
It also demonstrates a keen appreciation of the gap
between the ideal and the real. In discussing “Unity
of Effort,” for example, FM 3-24 distinguishes the differences between a “Preferred Division of Labor,” in
which civil and military participants from both the
supporting and host nation perform their appropriate
tasks, and “Realistic Division of Labor,” which recognizes that the military may be the only fully functioning entity in a war-torn country. “By default, U.S. and
multinational military forces often possess the only
readily available capability to meet many of the local
populace’s fundamental needs,” it concludes.
Despite its many merits, though, FM 3-24 has one
significant weakness. Its discussion of insurgency focuses too narrowly on the communist model in which
insurgency unfolds methodically through distinct
phases. The manual overlooks chronic insurgency
and the role of shadow governance. These deficiencies may help explain why U.S. forces have had such
difficulty conducting COIN in Afghanistan. Pashtuns
in the countryside care more about effective governance in their towns and villages than they do about
the central government in Kabul, as long as it does not
interfere with their lives. The cities have never been
the center of gravity in Afghanistan.
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The FM 3-24 (2014).
Good doctrine, COIN or otherwise, is never static.
The military must constantly update it to incorporate
lessons learned in the field and new research on the
subject. With this realization in mind, the Pentagon
produced a new edition of FM 3-24 in 2014. It not only
revised, but also completely overhauled, the 2006
manual, preserving the best of the previous edition
while augmenting it with new material. The authors
changed the structure, beginning with an analysis of
the environment in which intrastate conflicts arise,
moving to a nuanced discussion of the nature of insurgency, and concluding with how to counter it. This
highly effective organization intentionally seeks “to
provide the context of a problem, the problem, and
possible solutions.”60 The manual’s new title, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, reflects its comprehensive understanding of intrastate conflict and its
flexible, pragmatic approach to addressing the threat.
The new version of FM 3-24 also discusses a more
diverse range of insurgencies and recognizes the
insurgent-criminal nexus that often exists in such
conflicts. Rather than define insurgencies in terms of
fixed characteristics, the manual examines them using
“common dynamics: leadership, objective, ideology
and narratives, environment and geography, external
support and sanctuaries, phasing and timing.”61 This
innovative conceptual framework avoids the unhelpful tendency to assign insurgencies to fixed categories.
The new edition of FM 3-24 is comprehensive and nuanced in its treatment of COIN. It stresses the need for
flexible planning, recognizing that sound principles
can produce different approaches to solving a problem depending on the circumstances. It emphasizes
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unity of effort, the primacy of intelligence, limits on
the use of force, and building host-nation capacity. It
also includes a very helpful section on the “paradoxes
of counterinsurgency,” which contains the wisdom
that “sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.”62
Finally, the manual provides a lengthy discussion
of assessment, stressing the importance of developing ways to determine whether a COIN strategy is
succeeding.
The 2006 edition of FM 3-24 is good; however, the
2014 version is even better. Together they have corrected the post-Vietnam error of relegating COIN to
broad, amorphous, and largely unhelpful categories
such as “low-intensity conflict” or “operations other
than war,” where it could be largely ignored. Doctrine, however, gets the military only so far. It must
be matched by capability. Capability consists of designated forces and the training they receive, as well
as learning institutions. Examination of current capability must therefore precede discussion of the future
role COIN should play in national military strategy
and land forces allocations.
CURRENT CAPABILITY
The United States military consists of active duty,
Reserve, and National Guard components. The totalforce concept developed after the end of the draft
intended for Guard and Reserve units to operate in
support of regular combat forces. Since insurgencies
render meaningless the distinction between front and
rear areas, however, many Guard and Reserve units
found themselves at the sharp end of hostilities in
both Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, many soldiers
and marines from all three total-force components
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have significant experience in COIN. That reservoir of
talent will decline as men and women retire and as
the armed services concentrate on other threats. Only
one component of the military focuses specifically on
unconventional conflict: the U.S. SOCOM, created in
1987. The U.S. military has also created learning institutions dedicated to studying COIN.
Force Structure.
While the Navy and Air Force contribute units
to SOCOM and provide invaluable support for missions, the Army and Marine Corps shoulder most of
the responsibility for COIN, which consists primarily
of ground operations. The current strength of the active-duty Army is approximately 490,000; the Guard
and Reserve, 552,200. The Marine Corps consists of
184,100 active duty personnel and 39,000 reservists.63
Army strength is to be reduced to 450,000 by 2017, but
that could change, depending on the policy of the new
administration or a change in the international security situation. Total strength is not, of course, combat
strength. As of 2011, only 17% of active duty military
personnel performed “combat specialties.”64 Given
that the tooth-to-tail ratio for the Navy and Air Force
are significantly lower than for the ground forces, and
the ambiguity over what constitutes a “combat specialty,” the Army and Marine Corps probably have
a better ratio of combat arms to support personnel.
Even they, however, would be doing well if 20% of
a deployed force engaged in direct combat activities.
Deciding whether or not current troop strength
is adequate to meet current needs depends on whom
you ask and how he/she assesses the threat environment. Anyone arguing for the virtues of expedi-
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tionary COIN should remember that the simultaneous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan stretched the Army
very thin, necessitated extensive use of Guard and Reserve forces, and created a very unhealthy operational
tempo that placed an incredible burden on military
personnel and their families. At the height of those
conflicts, troop strength was considerably higher than
it is now, and that was before Russia moved against
the Ukraine and China became more assertive in East
Asia. Whether the United States could afford such a
labor-intensive mission in today’s threat environment
is a moot point.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
The missions in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that every soldier and marine may be called
upon under certain circumstances to conduct COIN
operations and that they are more than capable of doing so. One element of the American defense establishment, however, has COIN as a core task. Created
by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization
Act as the only non-geographic combatant command,
SOCOM is divided into four service commands, seven
regional commands, and one joint command. It consists of approximately 66,000 active duty and reserve
service personnel, including: 27,000 Army, 3,000 Marines, 10,000 Navy, and 19,500 Air Force.65
Direct Action, such as the dramatic raid on Osama
bin Laden’s hideout, makes up a small percentage of
SOCOM operations, but it looms large in public perceptions of what its forces do. Training and advising
foreign militaries comprises the bulk of SOF activities.
SOCOM’s regional sub-commands deploy small liaison teams to numerous countries. The vast majority
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of these deployments involve no combat. In some cases, though, advising quickly turns into direct action.
On October 22, 2015, a SOF team advising a Kurdish
Peshmerga unit during a raid to liberate ISIS captives
joined in the fight when the Kurds got into trouble.
One American died in the engagement. In a COIN
campaign, direct action and advising would occur simultaneously and on a regular basis.
Another vital element of SOCOM essential in a
COIN campaign is its CA Battalions. CA units conduct activities to support the civilian population. This
support includes humanitarian relief, infrastructure
projects, and capacity building, which are tasks vital
to the success of COIN. Because CA requires skills
more commonly found in the civilian world than in
the armed services, most of the U.S. Army’s CA capacity, some 100,000 personnel, resides in the reserve.
Because CA may be required at short notice, however,
the U.S. Army SOCOM maintains an active duty CA
brigade (five battalions) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.66 The size of this component includes three more
active duty CA battalions than existed before the start
of the Iraq War.
The United States has expanded SOCOM to deal
with the increase in unconventional threats. Its 66,000
troops perform a wide variety of activities. SOCOM
alone could thus not sustain a large-scale COIN campaign without compromising its ability to perform the
other tasks in its broad mission. SOF units could support a host nation or even several host nations facing
internal threats. SOCOM cannot by itself, however,
conduct a protracted expeditionary COIN campaign.
Those who advocate relegating COIN to SOCOM,
where it resided prior to the invasion of Iraq, would
do well to keep this limitation in mind.
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Learning Institutions.
The COIN capacity of the U.S. military includes
not only personnel capable of carrying out operations,
but also the institutions it has developed to capture
and transmit lessons learned. The armed services
have a broad range of schools and centers, including:
command and staff colleges, war colleges, and a National War College to educate officers as they advance
through their careers. COIN is part of the curriculum,
to varying degrees, at all of them. In addition to these
generic schools, two learning institutions in particular deal specifically with unconventional conflicts: the
U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence,
and the U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Center and
Integration Division.
Along with the U.S. Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute, the Special Operations Center
at Fort Bragg has taken over the role of the Irregular
Warfare Center, which closed in October 2014.67 The
Special Operations Center “trains, educates, develops
and manages world-class Civil Affairs, Psychological
Operations and Special Forces warriors and leaders
in order to provide our nation with highly educated,
innovative and adaptive operators.”68 The Center preserves and transmits lessons of past and contemporary conflicts as it trains the next generation of SOF.
Its location within SOCOM, however, may limit its
impact on the Regular Army.
The Small Wars Center and Irregular Warfare Integration Division at Quantico, Virginia, performs the
same function for the U.S. Marine Corps as the Special
Operations Center does for the Army. It also publishes the Small Wars Journal, a useful forum for presenting research on COIN and other unconventional war
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subjects. Together, these institutions serve as a valuable repository of the collective experience gained in
Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as venues for continuing to discuss COIN. As the memory of the two conflicts fades, the importance of these and other learning
institutions will increase.
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
The U.S. military in general and the U.S. Army in
particular clearly have a significant COIN capability.
Whether that capability is adequate for the contemporary security environment depends upon an assessment of current and future threats. Three key strategic
documents contain the most current threat assessment
conducted by the U.S. Government: the Quadrennial
Defense Review: 2014; the 2015, Defense Intelligence
Agency’s (DIA) annual Worldwide Threat Assessment;
and the Pentagon’s The National Military Strategy of the
United States of America: 2015. All three were written
before a series of ISIS terrorist attacks were launched
against Turkey, Russia, Lebanon, France, and the
United States in late-Fall 2015, so, like any such documents, they need constant updating. Nonetheless, the
reports provide an accurate assessment of the contemporary security environment.
Quadrennial Defense Review.
Conducted every 5 years, the most recent review,
Quadrennial Defense Review: 2014, begins with a chapter on “The Future Security Environment.” The chapter examines current regional and global trends in order to identify future threats; Russia and China figure
most prominently in this assessment. “In particular,

43

the rapid pace and comprehensive scope of China’s
military modernization continues,” the Review warns,
“combined with a relative lack of transparency and
openness from China’s leaders regarding both military capabilities and intentions.”69 China’s assertion
of exclusive rights in the South China Sea and its bellicose behavior toward Japan, the Philippines, and
Vietnam warrant concern. The Review also notes that:
“Russia’s multi-dimensional defense modernization
and actions that violate the sovereignty of its neighbors present risks.”70 The violation of sovereignty
mentioned in this statement refers to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and Russian support for separatists in eastern Ukraine. To those concerns could be
added the Kremlin’s effort to assert control over the
oil-rich Arctic Ocean.
In addition to discussing the threat posed by traditional rivals Russia and China, the Review identifies
threats posed by smaller nations. North Korea has
an active nuclear program and behaves in a bellicose
manner toward its neighbors. It has ballistic missiles
capable of hitting South Korea and Japan. “Continued
instability in the Balkans and on the periphery of Europe,” the report explains, threatens U.S. allies in that
region.71 The refugee crisis, which has intensified since
the Review came out in March, has added to that instability in Southeastern Europe as most of the people
fleeing violence in Syria pass through Balkan states on
their way to Western Europe.
Besides these conventional threats, the Review
identifies a host of unconventional ones, all of which
have serious implications for defense planning and
resource allocation. Transnational organized crime
has security implications, especially when it intersects
with other threats. Terrorism remains a serious inter-
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national problem, though not an existential threat. The
United States has suffered cyber-attacks perpetrated
by states as well as by rogue individuals. The Review
recognizes that the U.S. military may also need to support allied nations threatened by insurgency.
DIA Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment.
Each year the DIA reports to Congress on the
threats facing the United States. By the time the DIA
Director addressed the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 26, 2015, the international situation had changed significantly from what it had been
at the time of the Quadrennial Review published almost
a year before. ISIS exploded onto the international
stage with the capture of Mosul in mid-June 2014. It
soon gained control of a swathe of territory stretching
through Iraq and Syria. ISIS created a shadow government, instituted a brutal version of Sharia law, and
developed an international terrorist network. The Director described these developments as “worrying,”
as was the collapse of the Iraqi military in the face of
ISIS attacks.72
The Director also expressed concern about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. Despite 13 years
of aid, training, and direct assistance, the Afghan Security Forces were still not able to secure their country
without significant U.S. help, including boots on the
ground. Events soon justified this concern. In September 2015, the Taliban captured the town of Kunduz
north of the capital, Kabul, and in October, President
Obama announced that the United States would not
withdraw its remaining combat troops as planned. It
would maintain a force of 9,800 in the country through
2016 and reduce it to 5,500 the following year. Even
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this extended timetable for withdrawal may prove to
be optimistic.
The Director shared the concern for a resurgent
Russia and a more assertive China expressed by the
Quadrennial Review. He also voiced the same fear of
North Korea, adding that the poor quality of the dictatorship’s conventional forces increased the likelihood
that it would continue developing its nuclear arsenal
along with ballistic missile delivery systems. Testifying before the United States reached a nuclear arms
limitation agreement with Iran, the director named
the Islamic Republic as a regional threat in the Middle
East. He also mentioned internal threats to America’s
precarious ally Pakistan as a security concern.
In addition to discussing conventional threats, the
DIA Director considered the same unconventional
ones noted by the Quadrennial Review. Al-Qaeda and
its affiliates (al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, etc.) remained
a priority, but ISIS topped his list of concerns even before the wave of attacks it conducted in late-Fall 2015.
The possibility that such groups might use a weapon
of mass destruction (WMD) is worrisome. The Director also expressed concern over cyberthreats mounted
by hostile states, terrorist organizations, and/or rogue
individuals.
National Military Strategy.
The National Military Strategy of the United States
of America: 2015 is derived from the National Security
Strategy, but it focuses on military threats. Instead of
grouping these threats into distinct categories, it arranges them along a continuum with “state conflict” at
one end and “nonstate conflict” at the other. Between
these two, there is a third area of “hybrid conflict.”73
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The strategy graphs these three types of conflict based
on the probability and consequences of each. Conventional conflict between states has a low probability, but
serious consequences should it ever occur. The report
notes, however, that the probability of state conflict is
increasing. Nonstate conflict is far more probable, but
its consequences are less serious.
The National Military Strategy of the United States of
America: 2015 identifies the same threats as the other
assessments. In the conventional arena, it sees a resurgent Russia and an assertive China along with
the rogue state North Korea as causes for concern.
The document uses the term “Violent Extremist Organization” instead of “terrorism” to describe that
major unconventional threat, a clear recognition that
the organizations, not their tactics, can be targeted.
The Strategy makes no specific mention of COIN, but
speaks often of supporting American allies. Presumably, COIN would fall in the category of hybrid war.
CURRENT STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF COIN
From Threat Assessment to Defense Strategy.
Identifying threats and even prioritizing them is
much easier than devising a strategy for countering
them. The case of China illustrates this problem. The
United States wants to support its regional allies: the
Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan. It does not recognize
China’s claim to sovereignty over the South China Sea
and views with alarm Chinese assertiveness there and
in the East China Sea off Japan. The Pentagon is also
alarmed by China’s development of weapons systems
designed to outmatch American forces in the region:
particularly a long-range, anti-ship missile that threat-
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ens to reduce the effectiveness of aircraft carriers. The
White House has promised a “rebalancing to Asia,”
vowing to move assets to the region to counter the
Chinese threat.
What, however, does “countering” actually mean?
The United States can deploy more naval vessels and
aircraft to East Asia, but they will have no deterrent
effect unless Beijing believes U.S. forces will engage
Chinese ones. Washington will almost certainly avoid
such a confrontation in the interest of world peace,
which means China will have considerable freedom
to operate in its near abroad, just as the United States
has always done in the Caribbean. This strategic reality calls into question the wisdom of spending billions
on military assets that cannot realistically be used.
Economic leverage and diplomatic maneuvering, including an alliance with former enemy Vietnam, will
probably achieve more than carrier battle groups or
strike aircraft can.
The same may be said about Russian activity in
Ukraine. Economic sanctions are hurting Russia, although it is not clear whether they will change the
Kremlin’s behavior. Even if Moscow were to annex the
eastern Ukraine, as it did Crimea, Washington would
avoid any direct military confrontation with Russian
forces. Arguably, this region has already become a de
facto part of Russia. The real concern is where Moscow might move next. Disgruntled Russian minorities
in the Baltic States could be a source of further Russian
meddling. Since these nations belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States
is obligated to defend them. The June 2015 decision
to deploy tanks, artillery, and other equipment to the
Baltics sent a clear message that the United States
will back its allies. Vladimir Putin is, however, very
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unlikely to provoke a direct confrontation with NATO
forces. Nor will he engage allied naval and air forces
directly in the oil-rich Arctic Sea, much of which he
claims as a Russian preserve. A massive buildup of
conventional forces in Europe would be expensive
and have too little effect, since neither side wishes a
direct confrontation.
The unconventional threats enumerated by the
U.S. Department of Defense and the DIA, like their
conventional counterparts, are easier to list than to
counter. Few of them can be addressed by purely military means. The most serious threat—cyberattacks—
may best be handled by intelligence agencies rather
than the Pentagon. Countering terrorism does involve
military activity, but it also requires efforts by law enforcement and the intelligence community. Support
for foreign states threatened by insurgency requires a
coordinated effort by the Department of State, the U.S.
Agency for International Development, and a host of
other government and non-governmental agencies, as
well as the Department of Defense.
Matching Capabilities is not Strategy.
The United States thus faces threats it can easily
identify but not easily counter. In such a situation, the
Pentagon may fall back on the Cold War stratagem
of matching or exceeding its adversaries’ capabilities. This approach might have worked in the era of
super-power confrontation when Washington rightly
feared that to allow the enemy to develop a technological or numerical edge was to invite aggression.
In the more complex, multi-polar world of today, it
probably would not. Deterrence still matters, but trying to match China and Russia ship for ship, tank for
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tank, and plane for plane would be very expensive
and largely ineffective. Even with superior numbers
and equipment, the United States would not confront
militarily either nation operating in its near abroad,
provided it did not directly attack an American ally,
which Beijing and Moscow have the good sense not to
do. The United States will certainly defend its allies in
the Far East, but it will not start World War III over a
pile of rocks in the Sea of Japan.
Trying to match adversaries in every weapon system in every contested area will not secure the American homeland nor protect U.S. allies and interests
abroad, but it will add to the national debt and thus
weaken the country. Acquisition of equipment must
be based on a strategy designed to employ it effectively; meanwhile, conventional capabilities cannot
be neglected. The prospect of even a mid-level conventional war seems remote. Unconventional threats
abound, and those threats can be countered through
direct and indirect action. COIN capabilities provide
a valuable asset in this security effort. Those capabilities, however, must be based upon a comprehensive,
flexible strategy.
COIN AND THE U.S. MILITARY
Current U.S. Strategy.
Contrary to what its title proclaims, the annual National Security Strategy presents a list of broad strategic
goals rather than a detailed strategic plan for achieving them. The Quadrennial Review does a better job of
articulating such a strategy based upon its threat assessment and projected force capabilities. That strategy rests upon the three Department of Defense pillars:
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•

•

•

Protect the homeland, to deter and defeat attacks on
the United States and to support civil authorities
in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and
natural disasters.
Build security globally, in order to preserve regional
stability, deter adversaries, support allies and
partners, and cooperate with others to address
common security challenges.
Project power and win decisively, to defeat aggression, disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, and
provide humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief [italics in original].74

The National Military Strategy of the United States: 2015
builds upon the National Security Strategy and the Quadrennial Review, identifying specific national security
interests:
•
•
•
•
•
•

The survival of the Nation.
The prevention of catastrophic attack against U.S.
territory.
The security of the global economic system.
The security, confidence, and reliability of our
allies.
The protection of American citizens abroad.
The preservation and extension of universal
values.75

From these interests the National Military Strategy
derives national military objectives:
•
•
•

Deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries.
Disrupt, degrade, and defeat violent extremist
organizations.
Strengthen our global network of allies and
partners.76

Other than expressing a desire to operate across the
conflict spectrum, The National Military Strategy of the
United States of America: 2015 does not explain precisely how it will fulfill those three objectives.
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Prioritizing Threats.
The United States currently faces no serious conventional threat to its homeland. Terrorism, domestic
and international, remains a persistent but not an existential threat. Domestic terrorism has taken more lives
over the past decade, but the responsibility for handling it belongs to law enforcement. Since 9/11, only
two international terrorism plots have taken place on
American soil: the April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon
bombing, which killed 4 people (including a police
officer shot by the escaping perpetrators); and the
December 2, 2015, San Bernardino, California mass
shooting, which killed 14 people. Since lone-wolf terrorists residing in the United States and acting out of
sympathy for Islamist extremists perpetrated both
attacks, however, the plots were not entirely international. The November 2015 Paris attacks, however,
serve as a grim reminder that organizations like ISIS
still have the potential to cause mass casualties and
inflict severe economic damage. Acting against terrorist organizations before they strike or in retaliation
for attacks falls to the military, which may also help
mitigate the consequences of an incident at home. Cyberthreats have the enormous potential to cause harm;
however, just how big a role the military should play
in countering them is unclear.
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COIN and U.S. Strategy.
This monograph focuses on U.S. military preparedness to meet unconventional threats. Critics of
COIN should breathe easier reading the Quadrennial
Review, the National Strategy, and The National Military
Strategy of the United States of America: 2015. If there
ever was a risk that the Army and Marines would
focus disproportionately on COIN, that danger has
clearly past. The Quadrennial Review makes clear that
“our forces will no longer be sized to conduct largescale prolonged stability operations.”77 This conclusion reflects the views of a Congress and public weary
of large-scale, long-term nation-building operations.
“The Department of Defense will rebalance our counterterrorism [CT] efforts toward greater emphasis on
building partnership capacity,” the Review explains,
“especially in fragile states, while retaining robust capability for direct action, including intelligence, persistent surveillance, precision strike, and Special Operations Forces.”78 This assertion reveals a reversion to
the indirect approach of the El Salvadoran civil war,
but also the tendency to conflate “CT” with “COIN.”
The “rebalancing” of the strategic approach to
COIN and CT requires a corresponding rebalancing
of forces. Following the withdrawal of U.S. combat
troops from Iraq and their anticipated (albeit delayed)
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Pentagon planned
for reductions in U.S. forces. Recent activity by ISIS
and/or the 2016 presidential election may result in
a reversal of plans to reduce the active duty military
and reserve components. If the impending cuts are
not made, it is quite likely that at least some of the
additional troops will be allocated to SOCOM. In the
meantime, the Pentagon must base its planning on
projected personnel numbers.
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The Quadrennial Review outlines the shape of the
new leaner military. The Air Force will have to make
due with fewer fighters and a reduced transport capability, but it will continue to develop and acquire
stealth aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones. These precision weapons, especially the drones, play a major role in CT and COIN
because of their ability to penetrate hostile territory
with no risk to U.S. personnel and to strike enemy
targets with great precision. The Navy will increase
its number of ships through 2020. The Pentagon aims
to maintain 10 aircraft carrier strike groups, although
what threats such a large, expensive collection of
ships is designed to counter remains unclear. China
and Russia have one carrier each. The other nations
with carriers have at most two and are either neutral
nations or American allies.
The two services that would engage most heavily
in conventional and unconventional wars, the Army
and Marine Corps, face significant manpower cuts.
The active duty Army will be reduced to 440,000450,000 from its peak strength of 570,000 at the height
of the Iraq War; the National Guard will be reduced
from 358,000 to 335,000, and the Reserve from 205,000
to 195,000.79 The active duty Marine Corps will be reduced from 184,100 to 182,000, which includes 900 additional embassy guards.80 The United States is thus
building ships it may never use and cutting troops it
will probably not deploy. One set of ground forces,
though, has been increased significantly, and is slated
to receive even more resources. SOCOM strength will
increase from its current level of 66,000 to 69,700.81
The U.S. military thus has a broad range of assets
in a highly flexible joint establishment capable of engaging in a number of missions. It also has an excel-
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lent doctrine for a wide array of operations, including
COIN and CT. How precisely the Pentagon would use
this doctrine to develop a strategy to deploy these assets to achieve the goals identified in the National Security Strategy, particularly projecting power globally,
is not entirely clear. Addressing that question requires
considering what role, if any, COIN should play in
training and equipping U.S. forces.
Options.
As the U.S. military in general and the Army in
particular considers the role COIN should play in its
contingency planning, it has four options. Each option has implications for force allocation and training
as well as advantages and disadvantages. Choosing
among them must be based on current threat assessments and consideration of the degree to which threats
can be countered by military means.
Option 1: Revert to Conventional Approach. The U.S.
military might, as some critics of COIN argue that it
should, revert to the approach of the 1990s. During
that period, the Pentagon focused on being able to
fight two short-term, mid-level conventional wars. It
relegated COIN and other unconventional activities to
the newly created SOCOM. The Salvadoran civil war
seemed to provide the best model for aiding friendly
governments threated by insurgency. A small number of SOF advisors assisting the host-nation military
equipped by the United States appeared to offer a
low-cost approach to COIN.
This approach had much to commend it; however,
it had some serious problems as well. It allowed the
U.S. military to concentrate on what it considered its
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primary task, preparing to fight and win the nation’s
wars. Operation DESERT STORM during the 1991
Gulf War provided exactly the kind of conflict the
Pentagon wished to fight, a short and decisive conventional action using overwhelming force and exploiting
its vast superiority in technology and firepower. The
Gulf War seemed to vindicate U.S. military strategy.
As the 1990s wore on, however, it became clear that
there would be no more DESERT STORM type of operations. The U.S. military would instead be called
upon to participate in internal security operations in
Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo—missions dubbed “nation building”—which looked far too much like COIN
for the Pentagon’s comfort. Then 9/11 happened,
and the U.S. military soon found itself in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Its prowess at conventional war allowed it
to overrun both countries rapidly, but lack of preparation for the COIN campaigns that followed led to
disaster.
The problem with the no-COIN approach is that
reality cannot be changed by wishful thinking. The
U.S. military does not get to pick its wars. Unconventional threats far exceed conventional ones in number
and frequency. Like it or not, America’s Armed Forces
may at a moment’s notice be tasked with conducting
a COIN campaign. That happened in Iraq in 2004.
Neither the Army nor the Marines could avoid the
mission by insisting that they did not like it or were
not prepared to carry it out. The small number of SOF
with any COIN training or experience available at the
time could not stabilize such a large country. Regular
units, including Guard and Reserve contingents, had
to learn COIN on the fly. They rose to the challenge,
but the period of adjustment proved costly in lives
and treasure.
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Option 2: Focus on Unconventional Threats. Given
the preponderance of unconventional threats in the
contemporary security environment and the cost and
limited use of many conventional weapons systems,
focusing on unconventional threats might seem like
an attractive option. The U.S. military could never
completely abandon its conventional capability, but
it might choose to devote more of its personnel and
resources to countering asymmetric threats as General Petraeus recommended. Such an approach would
mean fewer tanks and more Stryker vehicles, fewer
bombers and more drones. Regular units as well as
SOF would spend more time training for COIN, CT,
and other unconventional operations.
This approach has some serious problems that
argue against its adoption. Though fewer in number
than unconventional threats, conventional ones are
more serious. Terrorism has the potential to hurt the
United States, but it does not threaten the survival of
the country. Foreign interventions, including expeditionary COIN campaigns, are wars of choice, not wars
of necessity. Allowing conventional capabilities in
Europe to deteriorate too far might invite Russian aggression on the fringes of NATO. Weakening conventional forces in Asia would send the wrong message to
regional allies and embolden China.
In addition to these concerns, placing too much
emphasis on unconventional operations overlooks an
important point. Analysts often make a clear distinction between conventional and unconventional war
that does not exist in the real world. Iraq and Afghanistan, like Vietnam before them, were hybrid wars. In
both conflicts, the United States conducted conventional operations and COIN at the same time and often in support of one another. The battle against ISIS is

57

proving to be another hybrid affair. The United States
and its allies have conducted extensive conventional
air strikes. These strikes have been most effective
when carried out in support of local forces assisted
by SOF advisers. Focusing predominantly on either a
conventional or unconventional capability ignores the
relationship between them, and would therefore be a
bad idea.
Option 3: Develop Two-Speed Soldiers. Most militaries around the world do not have the luxury of creating specialists to deal with each category of threat.
Their soldiers must be able to perform security missions across the spectrum of operations. They train
two-speed soldiers capable of conventional and unconventional operations. European states during the
era of decolonization conducted their COIN campaigns with regular soldiers, many of them conscripts.
Their ability to practice COIN does not seem to have
compromised their preparedness for conventional operations. The same British Army that won in Malaya
fought well in Korea.
While training two-speed soldiers has a cost-saving benefit, it would not work as well today as it did
when warfare relied less on technology. Sophisticated
weapons systems require a high degree of education
and training to operate. Time spent training for and
conducting unconventional operations such as COIN
probably does not adversely affect (and may even enhance) the readiness of soldiers preforming support
roles. Logistics is, after all, logistics. For some combat
arms, however, training for and conducing sustained
unconventional operations might erode conventional
war-fighting skills. During the height of the Iraq War,
three Brigade Combat Team commanders wrote a
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white paper complaining that, with most artillerymen
operating outside their traditional roles, 90 percent of
artillery units were not prepared to provide fire support in a high-intensity conflict.82 The U.S. military
thus cannot rely upon two-speed soldiers—generalists capable of performing a range of tasks adequately,
but none of them well.
Option 4: Retain COIN as a Core SOF Function. Between forgoing COIN preparation entirely and reconfiguring the entire Armed Forces for asymmetric warfare lies a realistic middle ground. With an expanded
SOCOM projected to number almost 70,000 personnel, assigning primary responsibility for COIN to
SOF makes more sense than it did when the SOF community was a small, marginalized part of the Armed
Forces. “Primary responsibility” does not, however,
mean “exclusive responsibility.” While no one, civilian or military, is eager to engage in another Iraq-style
intervention, the U.S. Armed Forces may at some future date be asked to deploy an expeditionary COIN
mission whether or not they wish to do so. As long as
that possibility exists, training for regular forces must
include a modicum of COIN instruction.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Of the options to consider, number four offers the
best alternative for the U.S. military to counter the
range of threats it faces in the contemporary security
environment. The Armed Forces in general and the
U.S. Army in particular cannot afford to ignore COIN
completely or to become preoccupied with it. Accepting that broad option requires the consideration of
specific recommendations for implementing it.
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Prepare for Conflict across the Threat Spectrum but
Prioritize Threats.
Conventional war between nations and alliances
may be improbable, but the consequences of such a
conflict, should it occur, would be grave. Critics of
COIN are, therefore, right to insist that nothing be
done to weaken the military’s ability to fight and win a
conventional war. As long as potentially hostile states
maintain large conventional establishments, the United States must focus on countering the threats they
pose. Losing a COIN campaign would be a setback;
losing a conventional war would be a disaster.
Keep Primary Responsibility for COIN in SOCOM.
The Pentagon increased its SOF during the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars. It has wisely decided to not only
spare SOCOM from personnel reductions, but also
to increase its strength even further. SOCOM already
includes COIN in its list of core tasks and should continue to do so.
Develop COIN Surge Capacity.
Primary responsibility does not mean sole responsibility. During the post-Vietnam era, the regular forces relegated COIN to SOF, a decision they believed
relieved them of any responsibility for preparing for
COIN. That decision had disastrous consequences in
Iraq, where an insurgency developed rapidly after
the American invasion. The intrastate conflict was too
large for SOF to handle alone, especially in the face
of Pentagon reluctance to admit that an insurgency
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was developing. Soldiers trained almost exclusively
for conventional operations thus found themselves
patrolling neighborhoods in Baghdad and other Iraqi
cities, learning COIN the hard way by trial and error.
They adapted, but the delay was costly in lives and
treasure.
The experience of Iraq suggests that it would be a
mistake, therefore, to assume that regular forces will
never be asked to engage in COIN. On the other hand,
demands for training time have been increasing. Given
that constraint, it does not make sense to spend inordinate amounts of time training regular troops for this
one contingency. The Army should, however, develop
the capacity to train conventional soldiers for COIN
in the event of a major expedition. Since SOF liaison
teams already spend much of their time training and
advising foreign armies, it would be easy for them to
perform the same function for their regular comrades
in arms, thus giving the Army the ability to “surge”
COIN forces as needed.
Preserve Learning Institutions.
The learning institutions created by the military
played a crucial role in preparing soldiers and marines
to conduct COIN operations. These included facilities
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the United States. The Army
even set up a mock Iraqi town at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. The Leader Development for Education and Sustained Peace program
dispatched mobile teams to help prepare Guard and
Reserve units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. Not
all of these programs and institutions can or should be
sustained on a regular basis, but the U.S. Army Special Operations Warfare Center of Excellence and the
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U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Center and Integration
Division continue as vibrant learning institutions, preserving the lessons of recent conflicts and studying the
challenges of unconventional warfare.
Embrace a more Expansive Concept of COIN.
The debate over COIN has been hampered by
the fallacious assumption that conventional and unconventional operations exist as distinct categories
of military activity in the real world. The wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and recent operations against
ISIS, demonstrate the fallacy of this distinction. Modern COIN is a hybrid affair in which conventional and
unconventional operations occur side by side. Fortunately, the latest rendition of The National Military
Strategy of the United States of America: 2015 recognizes
that COIN, as well as many other military operations,
belongs to the gray area of hybrid conflicts.
Avoid Expeditionary COIN.
The critics of COIN do make one very important
point: expeditionary COIN has not been successful
and should be avoided. The Vietnam War made abundantly clear that propping up a regime that lacks legitimacy in the eyes of its own people does not work.
Afghanistan and Iraq underscored that lesson. The
success of the Taliban stems in large measure from
its ability to govern more effectively at the local level
than the corrupt government in Kabul. Former Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s decision to govern Iraq in
the interests of its Shia majority led to the rise of ISIS.
In the face of such bad governance, the U.S. efforts to
train Iraqi and Afghan forces have enjoyed limited
success.
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Provide Assistance with Small Advisory Missions.
While large-scale expeditionary COIN has achieved
limited results, small advisory missions in support of
relatively stable governments have been more successful. As the situation in Iraq deteriorated, another
campaign was succeeding. Eclipsed by the two much
larger deployments, a U.S. advisory mission to the
Philippines contributed significantly to eliminating
a major terrorist threat. From 2001 to 2011, U.S. SOF
helped the Philippines’ military conduct an effective
COIN campaign against the al-Qaeda affiliate Abu
Sayyaf. The U.S. mission peaked at 1,200 personnel in
2001 and declined to 400 in 2011. Maintaining its average contingent of 600 cost approximately $50 million
a year at a time when the United States was spending
$2 billion a week in Afghanistan.83
Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)-Philippines was a low-cost, small-footprint mission operating with a limited mandate under restrictive rules of
engagement. It established broad, achievable strategic
goals:
•

•

•

Building Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) capacity. U.S.
ground, maritime, and air components trained,
advised, and assisted Philippine security forces to
help create a secure and stable environment.
Focused civil-military operations. Philippine-led,
U.S.-facilitated humanitarian and civic-action
projects demonstrated the government’s concern
for regional citizens and improved their quality of
life.
Information operations (IO). Aiming to enhance
government legitimacy in the region, the joint
U.S.-Philippine effort used IO to emphasize the
success of the first two lines of operation [italics
in original].84
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The JSOTF worked alongside AFP, but did not do the
fighting for them. In addition to this SOF effort, other
U.S. units improved roads and bridges and dug wells.
The Americans also provided intelligence that helped
the Philippine forces fix and destroy Abu Sayyaf
contingents.85
American assistance would not have been successful had the AFP themselves not been willing to
change their approach to COIN. During the 1970s,
civilians feared the army as a tool of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos. “There was not much emphasis on
human rights,” one Filipino general admitted.86 With
American support, the Filipinos changed their approach, providing security to local people, engaging
in humanitarian projects, and winning trust, which in
turn produced good intelligence on the insurgents.87
The strategy worked; Abu Sayyaf has been reduced
to a small terrorist/criminal organization engaging in
piracy but able to accomplish little else.
Critics, no doubt, will point out that doing COIN
on an island is much easier than conducting it in a vast
country like Afghanistan or Iraq. Nonetheless, the approach of JSOTF-Philippines has much to commend
it as a model for COIN. Like the operation in El Salvador, it underscores the lesson that under the right
circumstances a great deal can be accomplished by a
small advisory mission. The success of such a mission,
however, depends entirely on the willingness of the
host-nation government and its military to heed the
given advice and engage in needed reforms. Without
such a commitment, a U.S. mission can accomplish
little. The United States simply cannot win someone
else’s war for them. The larger the force deployed to a
host-nation the more likely it will be resented by the
local people as a foreign occupation, especially if it
props up a regime that lacks legitimacy.
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While the outcome of the struggle with ISIS remains unclear, considerable evidence suggests that
the small-footprint approach is having a positive effect on that struggle as well. U.S. advisory teams have
been working closely with Kurdish Peshmerga forces
operating in northern Iraq. On October 23, 2015, Kurds
backed by a U.S. SOF team conducted a successful
hostage rescue mission. Unfortunately, one U.S. soldier died in the assault, demonstrating how quickly
advisors can become combatants. On November 12,
2015, the Kurds with U.S. air support recaptured the
Iraqi town of Sinjar and regained control of an important north-south highway. The White House has
decided to increase the number of SOF teams and to
allow them to engage in direct action against ISIS.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. LAND POWER
At the heart of the debate over COIN is its impact
on land power. In the aftermath of two long and costly
wars, and with a growing national debt and budget
deficits, military cuts are very likely. The annual defense budget battle has always been a zero-sum game.
Money spent on ships is not available for airplanes;
funds devoted to SOF missions cannot be used for
conventional ones. With its strength slated for reduction by approximately 40,000 active duty personnel,
the U.S. Army might understandably feel as though
its 27,000 SOF soldiers would be better employed in
traditional roles, especially since SOCOM is not only
being spared the budget axe, but is also increasing in
size.
The loss of 40,000 regular soldiers does not, however, equate to a reduction in the number of combat
troops. The Army is working to increase its tooth-totail ratio, so that a higher percentage of those remain65

ing on active duty can perform combat roles. At the
same time, technology continues to replace personnel
on the modern battlefield. Furthermore, all SOF members began their military careers as conventionally
trained soldiers, and they can still participate in conventional operations. Finally, increased reliance on
civilian contractors for support functions frees active
duty military personnel for combat roles.
The best argument for a more robust SOF component in the U.S. military, though, is that it might prevent the large, costly expeditionary COIN missions
critics oppose. Had the United States entered Afghanistan and Iraq with such capacity, those conflicts might
have gone better. At the very least, the costly years
of trial and error might have been avoided and fewer
lives lost. The best course of action and the most likely
one for future COIN engagements, however, is to support only those governments that have a reasonable
chance of winning and to do so with as small a force
as possible.
CONCLUSION
Any study that examines military capability in order to improve it can conclude in one of two ways. It
can identify serious problems and propose steps to fix
them, or it can affirm that the Army has already found
the right path and should continue along it. This monograph draws the second conclusion. The U.S. military
in general and the Army in particular have steered a
course between two unhelpful extremes. Contrary to
the fears of many officers in 2006, the Army has not focused disproportionately on unconventional threats.
Perhaps to the dismay of those critics, neither has it
abandoned COIN as unworkable. It has instead iden-
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tified and prioritized threats, not just by the frequency
of their occurrence, but also by the seriousness of their
consequences. That assessment has led to the continued emphasis on conventional war, but with a significantly enhanced unconventional warfare capability.
The renewed focus on conventional war fighting
has not, however, caused a return to the days before
9/11 when the Pentagon’s ability to fight anything but
a mid-level conventional war was very limited. The
adoption of the new brigade combat team structure
makes the Army more flexible and better able to address threats across the conflict spectrum. An expanded SOCOM with an increase in the number of Army
SOF personnel improves the ability of the United
States to combat threats like ISIS. This expansion has
not adversely affected the other combat arms. Reductions in troop strength following the withdrawal from
Iraq can be offset by an improved tooth-to-tail ratio,
increased reliance on technology, and the use of civilian contractors to provide support services.
The Army also has good doctrine and effective
learning institutions. The 2006 edition of FM 3-24
articulated sound COIN doctrine. It drew upon historical examples and the recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although it arrived just in time
for the Anbar Awakening and the surge, the manual
did not in and of itself produce either of these successes. It did, however, provide useful guidance for a
population-centric approach to combating the insurgents. The failure of the U.S.-led missions to produce
stable, viable states in Afghanistan or Iraq is not the
fault of COIN doctrine. No government can be saved
from itself if it lacks legitimacy among its own people.
Contrary to what some critics imply, neither the Army
nor the Marine Corps have treated FM 3-24 as holy
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writ. The two services produced a new, completely
revised edition of it in 2014. The U.S. Army Special
Operations Center of Excellence and the U.S. Marine
Corps Small Wars Center and Integration Division
should continue to study COIN and help to improve
doctrine as needed.
Finally, the Army has discovered, or perhaps rediscovered, a viable alternative to large expeditionary COIN. An advisory mission of approximately
1,200 (much larger than the one in El Salvador, but
much smaller than those sent to Iraq and Afghanistan) proved highly effective in the Philippines. The
Armed Forces of the Philippines were fighting a small
insurgent group on an island, so the campaign should
not be touted as a simple template for future campaigns, but it was based on sound COIN principles.
The success that SOF teams are having supporting the
Kurds in the fight against ISIS suggests that, while
not foolproof, the small footprint mission is the right
approach, especially if it is augmented by air support
and intelligence sharing.
All signs thus suggest that the Army is not repeating the error of the post-Vietnam era. However,
as much as soldiers may dislike them, unconventional threats are not going away. There may not be
any large-scale expeditionary COIN missions on the
horizon, but the world abounds in a broad range of
insurgencies and insurgent-style threats. As long as
these threats persist, the U.S. military must be able to
counter them.
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